The focus of much of this new research, though important in debating both the importance of the ceasefire specifically and the utility of secret backchannel talks more generally, remains narrowly focused around those at the top of both the IRA and the British Government at the time.
With the IRA however, the case can be made that such an approach misses the important point that the Provisional IRA were the leading arm of a 'deeply rooted working-class ethno-nationalist movement' 7 and therefore one that still had to be representative in at least some respects of the communities, members and organisers through which they operated. Adams (who had been specifically released so that he could participate) and in the course of these talks it was agreed that a so-called 'incident hotline' would be established at Laneside, the building used for discreet talks between a whole range of government officials and political, religious, community and paramilitary figures throughout this period. This hotline was basically the office telephone number, with a messaging service for when Frank Steele was elsewhere. 21 While he may have been in charge of the talks, Steele did not have control over the security forces in Northern Ireland and the fact that security was being handled by a different section of the NIO proved problematic when issues and misunderstandings arose as a result of using the hotline.
The fact that anyone could telephone Steele for any reason was also problematic. Only days after the fractious Cheyne Walk meeting in London for example, Ó Conaill used the hotline to talk to Steele about his worries over the British Army's resistance to the occupation of vacant homes in the Steele did not step in to resolve the crisis that eventually broke the 1972 ceasefire -the Lenadoon affair -nor could he have stopped the shooting of a further five Catholic civilians (including a 13 year old girl and a priest) by British soldiers five miles away in Ballymurphy. 25 The hotline between negotiators was ill-equipped to deal with the minutiae of contentious incidents on the ground when the same channels were being used to discuss the broader political problem itself.
It was accepted by all parties that future ceasefires would need a systematic incident reporting and aversion scheme.
Seamus Loughran, although interned shortly after the Lenadoon affair, had been one of Although the interviewee dismissed the idea of passing on complaints to the police they did admit that they would phone 'HQ in Lower Falls' who they believed 'are in contact with the British Army
Authorities' should a breach of the ceasefire occur.
42
The Irish Times along with all the other major newspapers began covering stories that emanated from these centres on almost a daily basis. The centres gave journalists a location from where their questions could be answered and they no longer had to rely on their secretive and clandestine contacts or the less well-informed Dublin offices. Those who ran the incident centres included prominent northerners like Jimmy Drumm who ran the Falls Road incident centre/Sinn Féin Office and was cited on at least seventeen occasions by the Irish Times during the truce. 43 The centres gave credence, responsibility and a degree of respectability to those who had previously been living the covert lives of illegal guerrillas. But also, what is clear from press interactions with the Sinn Féin incident centres is a sense that those who staffed them felt they had a responsibility to reflect community feeling rather than impose it. The BBC Radio Ulster journalist elicited the telling quote, 'We in Sinn Féin, representing the people in this area, can only do what the people ask.' 44 In Derry, the incident centres' role in reporting breaches of the truce quickly became neglected. It was replaced instead by a new role of community restorative justice. Though socalled punishment attacks on those committing anti-social behaviour were nothing new, the incident centres allowed Sinn Féin to go after new and different targets. In September 1975 for example the IRA seized alcohol from publicans accused of selling to under-age youths. The plunder was put on display for both locals and the media 'at the ceasefire incident centres in Bogside' and those publicans from whom the alcohol had been seized were told they could only get in back by guaranteeing not to serve alcohol in future to the under-age youths.
45
The Security Forces in general -as was noted in numerous summaries of complaintstook a dim view of the development of the incident centres 46 and almost immediately began surveillance against them, questioning those who frequented them and occasionally entering the offices to search them. 47 This was especially true of the 2 nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (2Para), that summer stationed in West Belfast. 2Para, it was alleged, entered, surely] it was better that they expend their energies in a political way than in terrorism.' 53 Allan,
Cooper and Rees failed in their attempts to allay the UDA's fears and upon leaving these meetings
Tyrie announced that they intended to police loyalist areas themselves from the following evening. 54 In early 1975, division within the various loyalist groups meant that the UDA were bluffing.
When compared to the similar meetings the UDA leadership had had at the height of the UWC disturbances the previous year 55 far fewer now responded to the UDA call and their initiative thus lacked local support and quickly fizzled out. When the UDA held another meeting with Rees the following day, Tyrie backed down and changed his tone, making the excuse that 'the atmosphere had been so pleasant [this time] that he had not found an opportunity to shout.' 56 57 Despite the urgent assurances of the Secretary of State, the IRA ceasefire -which was pockmarked throughout by very serious instances of violence -was met by an increased loyalist paramilitary campaign which included some of these groups' most harrowing atrocities of the Troubles. , these were men who had spent the previous five years engaged in some of the most horrendous fighting Irish
Republicans had ever known. They had been interned and beaten, had killed and been killed in the name of the same goal as their successors. The army council contained numerous Northerners too at this time, all of whom were closely involved in the talks, even if those talks were never going to achieve their stated aim.
The Sinn Féin Incident Centres were essential to the 1975 ceasefire and furthermore gave the Provisional Movement a public face that it had not shown before. Although the vigilante element of this was never welcomed by the NIO, the offices that remained allowed Sinn Féin to become more visibly active in their communities than before. In the NIO's words
Sinn Féin was clearly 'politicising' itself, and this was cautiously welcomed. 68 To accept this conclusion one does not need to rule out the importance of Adams, Morrison and McGuinness later in the 1980s and 1990s, but it does highlight the fact that as a movement, the Provisionals were larger than these three figures and that they were altered by the historical precedent of these incident centres, in a way that many accounts have ignored. In fact, the incident centres mark the first foray into political representation for the Provisional Republican 
